Registrar General, High Court of Madras, Chennai v A. Kanagaraj and another

Madras High Court 14 June 2013 W.P. No. 28202 of 2012 and M.P. No. 1 of 2012 The Judgment was delivered by : M. Venugopal, J. 1. The Petitioner/Registrar General, High Court of Madras, Chennai, has focused the present Writ of Certiorari in calling for the records in Case No.18603-11 & 12498-12/Enquiry/A/2012, dated 17.05.2012 of the 2nd Respondent/Tamil Nadu Information Commission, Chennai and to quash the same. 2. The 2nd Respondent/Tamil Nadu Information Commission, Chennai, in Case No.18603-11 & 12498-12/Enquiry/A/2012, dated 17.05.2012, has passed an order inter alia observing that the Petitioner has requested for the documents relating to the Writ Petitions in the Court. It has already been mentioned on numerous occasions about the decision of the Commission in regard to the receipt of documents and copies from the Court. However, it is evident that in this instance, the Public Authority (Writ Petitioner) has not furnished any information to the Petitioner (First Respondent/ Applicant). As per the Right to Information Act, the information sought for by the Petitioner (1st Respondent/Applicant) ought to have been furnished to him, within thirty days or he should have been informed the procedures/methods in receiving those information. In this matter, the Public Authority failed etc., and resultantly, directed the Writ Petitioner to supply the copies to the 1st Respondent, at free of cost, under Section 7(6) of the Act on or before 25.05.2012. Moreover, the 2nd Respondent/Tamil Nadu Information Commission has also directed the Writ petitioner to submit his explanation to it on or before 31.05.2012 as to why action should not be taken under Section 20(1) of the Right to Information Act for not furnishing the information. 3. Challenging the impugned order dated 17.05.2012 in Case No.18603-11 & 12498-12/Enquiry/A/2012, passed by the Second Respondent/Tamil Nadu Information Commission, the Learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioner/Registrar General, High Court of Madras, submits that the 2nd Respondent/Tamil Nadu Information Commission failed to appreciate that the Application dated 23.12.2012, sent by the 1st Respondent/Applicant was similar to that of earlier Application, which was disposed of as per the statute. 4. The Learned Counsel for the Petitioner contends that the 2nd Respondent/Tamil Nadu Information Commission was not correct in entertaining the Second Appeal, as the motive of the 1st Respondent/Petitioner was to hinder the administrative functions of this Court and passed the impugned order dated 17.05.2012, ignoring a vital fact that he had already obtained the information sought for by him. The stand taken on behalf of the Petitioner/Registrar General, High Court of Madras is that the 1st Respondent/Applicant was provided with the requisite information relating to the rules, in and by which the copies of documents sought for by him, could be obtained by the Assistant Public Information Officer, through communication dated 27.04.2011 and later, by means of another communication dated 01.12.2011 of the Appellate Authority itself. As such, it is otiose on the part of the 2nd Respondent/Tamil Nadu Information Commission, to issue a direction by means of an impugned order dated 17.05.2012, directing the Petitioner/High Court of Madras to furnish the copies of the documents and in fact, the said act of the 2nd Respondent/Tamil Nadu Information Commission, is an unwarranted one. 5. The Learned Counsel for the Petitioner urges before this Court that the 2nd Respondent/Tamil Nadu Information Commission, had not issued notice to the concerned parties, pertaining to the proceedings in W.P.No.11597 of 1988 and W.P.No.12518 of 1994 and consequently, their objects/views have not been ascertained by the Commission, as required under Section 11 of theRight to Information Act, 2005. 6. Yet another legal argument projected by the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner is that in regard to the supply of copies of documents sought for by the 1st respondent/Applicant, this Court is governed by the Rules called Rules of the High Court, Madras, Appellate Side, 1965 . 7. Finally, the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner forcefully contends that there is a vast difference in regard to the custody of documents in the hands of the Public Authority and that of the Court of Law, because of the simple reason that the supply of copies of documents sought for by the Applicant and furnishing the same to a third party, would be detrimental to the interest of concerned parties to certain proceedings. Viewed in that perspective also, the impugned order dated 17.05.2012 passed by the 2nd Respondent/Tamil Nadu Information Commission, is liable to be set aside, in the interest of Justice. 8. In response, the Learned Counsel for the 1st Respondent/ Applicant submits that the 2nd Respondent/Tamil Nadu Information Commission has passed the impugned order in Case No.18603-11 & 12498-12/Enquiry/A/2012, dated 17.05.2012, by directing the Petitioner to supply the copies of documents to the 1st Respondent/Applicant, on or before 25.05.2012 under section 7(6) of theRight to Information Act, 2005, and further, the 2nd Respondent/Tamil Nadu Information Commission has also sought for explanation from the Petitioner, on or before 31.05.2012, as to why action should not be taken under Section 20(1) of the Act, for not furnishing the information and in short, the directions issued by the 2nd Respondent/Tamil Nadu Information Commission do not suffer from any impropriety or illegality in the eye of law. 9. The Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the 2nd Respondent/Tamil Nadu Information Commission submits that Section 4 of the Right to Information Act, 2005, speaks of Obligations of Public Authorities and also bringing it to the notice of this Court that the ingredients of Section 4(d) of theRight to Information Act, envisage that reasons are to be assigned by the Public Authority about their administrative or quasi-judicial decisions to the affected persons. 10. Added further, the Learned Senior Counsel for the 2nd Respondent/Tamil Nadu Information Commission refers to Section 22 of the Right to Information Act, which envisages that the provisions of this Act shall have overriding effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in the Official Secrets Act, 1923 and any other law for the time being in force etc., 11. It is evident that the 1st Respondent/Applicant projected an application/Petition dated 27.01.2011, addressed to the Public Information Officer {Registrar (Administration)} of this Court praying for (a)furnishing of copies of affidavit filed by the Petitioner in W.P.No.11597 of 1988 (b)supply of copies of affidavit in W.P.No.11597 of 1988 filed by the Respondent and (c)Supply of copies of the concerned orders passed in W.P.No.11597 of 1988. Further, he has also sought for (i)furnishing of copies of affidavit filed by the Petitioner in W.P.No.12518 of 1994 (ii)supply of copies of affidavit filed by the Respondent in W.P.12518 of 1994 and (iii)supply of copies of the concerned orders passed in W.P.No.12518 of 1994. The 1st Respondent/Applicant has paid a sum of Rs.10/- towards Fee in respect of the application made by him. 12. The 1st Respondent/Applicant filed an Appeal Petition under Section 19(1) of the Right to Information Act, 2005, before the Appellate Authority (under the Right to Information Act), Madras High Court, Chennai, among other things mentioning that no orders were passed by the Public Information Officer of the Petitioner/High Court of Madras, within a period of one month, specified under Section 7(1) of the Act and as such, he preferred the present Appeal requesting for supply of information to him (without collecting any charges) as per Section 7(6) of the Act. 13. It comes to be known that the Deputy Registrar/APIO (RTI Act), High Court, Madras, in ROC No.252/2011/RTI, dated 27.04.2011, addressed to the 1st Respondent/Applicant, has issued a reply stating that (1)Petition and affidavit in W.P.No.12518 of 1994, (2)Copy of the order dated 04.07.2011 in W.P.No.12518 of 1994, (3)Typedset of papers containing Page Nos. 1 to 78 and (4)List of members dated 26.08.1993, are available with the Registry of the Petitioner/High Court of Madras and directed him to obtain the copy of the aforesaid documents by filing Copy Application before C.D.Section of the Registry, as per the Rules of the High Court, Madras, Appellate Side, 1965. Further, the 1st Respondent/Applicant has been informed that in regard to the information sought for by him in respect of W.P.No.11597 of 1988 would be furnished to him as soon as the case bundle has been traced out. 14. The Writ Petitioner/Appellate Authority, through communication in ROC No.633/2011/RTI, dated 01.12.2011, addressed to the 1st Respondent/Applicant (with reference to his petition dated 27.01.2011 and Appeal Petition dated 10.03.2011 under the Right to Information Act) informed that the Assistant Public Information Officer was correct in informing that the copies of documents in W.P.No.12518 of 1994 as sought for by him may be obtained by filing Copy Application under the Madras High Court Appellate Side Rules, since there is separate provision for supply of copies of judicial documents. The 1st Respondent/Applicant was also informed that in similar manner, the documents sought for in W.P.No.11597 of 1988 may be obtained by him. 15. That apart, the 1st Respondent/Applicant filed an Application under the Right to Information Act, addressed to the Assistant Public Information Officer/Deputy Registrar, High Court, Madras, seeking supply of copies of affidavits in W.P.No.11597 of 1988 filed by the Petitioner and Respondent, together with all enclosed documents and copies of orders passed by the Honourable High Court in W.P.No.11597 of 1988. Furthermore, he prayed for supply of copies of affidavit in W.P.No.12518 of 1994 filed by the Petitioner and Respondent, together with all enclosed documents and also sought for issuance of copies of orders passed by the Honourable High Court in W.P.No.12518 of 1994. 16. The 1st Respondent/Petitioner preferred an Appeal dated 23.01.2012 under Section 19(1) of theRight to Information Act before the First Appellate Authority/Writ Petitioner (Registrar General, High Court of Madras) among other things averring that he could not obtain the information from the High Court, Public Information Officer, within 30 days, as required by him in his Application dated 23.12.2011(free of cost under Section 7(6) of the Act). 17. The 2nd Respondent/Tamil Nadu Information Commission in Case No.12498/A/12, dated 23.04.2012, issued summons to the Public Information Officer of the Registrar's Officer, High Court of Madras, requested him to appear on 16.05.2012 at 11.30 AM in connection with the Appeal dated 10.03.2012. 18. The 2nd Respondent, in Case No.18603-11 & 12498-12/Enquiry/ A/2012, dated 17.05.2012, passed the impugned order inter alia observing that ...it has already been mentioned that the decision of the Commission on numerous occasions were already mentioned in regard to the receipt of documents and copies to be obtained from the Court and that in the instant case, the Public Authority has not furnished any information to the 1st Respondent/Applicant and consequently, opined that the Public Authority failed and ultimately, directed to supply of copies at free of cost to the 1st Respondent/Applicant under Section 7(6) of the Act, on or before 25.05.2012 and also went to the extent of requiring the Petitioner/High Court of Madras, to submit his explanation to it on or before 31.05.2012, as to why action should not be taken under Section 20(1) of the Act, for not supplying the information. 19. It is to be borne in mind that the Right to Information Act, 2005 (Act 22 of 2005) was passed by the Indian Parliament during May 2005 and the Presidential assent was received during June 2005. The said Act came into force from 13.10.2005. 20. It is to be pointed out that the object of the Right to Information Act, 2005, is that right to information is not only a right of an individual but, a vital weapon to protect social interest. In fact, by the provisions of the Right to Information Act, 2005, the people of this Country have been emboldened to check an individual's performance and accountability. 21. It is true that Right to Privacy is not specified in the Constitution of India but, endeavours have been made by the Honourable Supreme Court to evaluate out of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 22. At this stage, we deem it appropriate to recall the words of Father of the American Constitution and erstwhile US President James Madison, who said Knowledge will forever govern ignorance and people who mean to be their own Governors must arm themselves with the power knowledge gives. A popular Government without popular information or the means of acquiring it is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy or perhaps both. 23. Undoubtedly, the current Society has turned into a Knowledge craving Society from that of feudal and agrarian one . An Homo-sapien by nature is inquisitive. 24. After all, a life of a person is a perennial search for truth. In fact, the restless soul is on the journey infinite to find out truth (vide Rigveda 10.8.18). Also that, Knowledge is Treasure but the Practice is the key to it. 25. In this connection, we aptly point out the words of Justice Louis and Brandies in Olmstead v. The United States (1927 (277) US 438), who said Right to let alone , the most comprehensive of the rights and most valued by civilised man. 26. There is no denying of the fact that Right to Privacy is a sacrosanct fabric of Article 21 of theConstitution. 27. It is to be pointed out that prior to coming into force of Right to Information Act, 2005 , in the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain and others, {AIR 1975 SUPREME COURT 865 1975 Indlaw SC 312}, it is held that people of the Country have a right to know every public act, even though that is done in a public way by the public functionaries . 28. Moreover, in the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court S.P. Gupta, V.M.Tarkunde, J.L.Karla and others, Iqbal M.Chagla and others, Rajappa, P.Subramaniam, D.N.Pandey and others v. President of India and others etc., {AIR 1982 SUPREME COURT 149 1981 Indlaw SC 599}, it is observed and held that the right to know has been given a constitutional status by treating it as a part of freedom of speech and expression and thereby, bringing this right within Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. More specifically, this right is also found in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 29.One cannot ignore an important fact that Access to Information is an essential requisite under the Right to Information Act. The said Act is an important mile stone in our Country's democratic development. A start to Right to Information has been made in the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court The State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh, The state of Maharashtra, Intervener, {AIR 1961 Supreme Court 493 1960 Indlaw SC 262}. 30. Further, in the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court Khanapuram Gandaiah v. Administrative Officer and others, {(2010) 2 Supreme Court Cases 1 2010 Indlaw SCO 3}, it is observed and held that the information sought for must be in existence and accessible to Public Authority . 31. Indeed, the definition Section 2(e)(iii) of the Right to Information Act, 2005, mentions the Chief Justice of the High Court in the case of a High Court, as the Competent Authority . In fact, Section 2 (f) under the caption Information means any material in any form, including records, documents, memos, e-mails, opinions, advices, press releases, circulars, orders, logbooks, contracts, reports, papers, samples, models, data material held in any electronic form and information relating to any private body which can be accessed by a public authority under any other law for the time being in force. 32. The definition Section 2(h) of the Right to Information Act under the head Public Authority means any Authority or body or institution of self-government established or constituted- the (a) by or under Constitution; (b) by any other law made by Parliament; (c) by any other law made by State Legislature; (d) by notification issued or order made by the appropriate Government, and includes any- (i) body owned, controlled or substantially financed; (ii) non-Government organisation substantially financed, directly or indirectly by funds provided by the appropriate Government. 33. Similarly, Section 2(i) defines Record which includes the following: (a) any document, manuscript and file; (b) any microfilm, microfiche and facsimile copy of a document; (c) any reproduction of image or images embodied in such microfilm (whether enlarged or not); and (d) any other material produced by a computer or any other device. 34. Section 2(j) of the Act, defines Right to Information which means the right to information accessible under this Act which is held by or under the control of any public authority and includes the right to- (i) inspection of work, documents, records; (ii) taking notes, extracts or certified copies of documents or records; (iii) taking certified samples of material; (iv) obtaining information in the form of diskettes, floppies,tapes, video cassettes or in any other electronic mode or through printouts where such information is stored in a computer or in any other device. 35. Section 2(m) of the Act defines State Public Information Officer which means the State Public Information Officer designated under Sub-section (1) and includes a State Assistant Public Information Officer designated as such Under Sub-section (2) of Section 5. 36. Section 3 speaks of all citizens, who shall have the right to information subject to the provisions of the Right to Information Act. 37. The ingredients of Section 4(1)(a) of the Act enjoins every public authority shall maintain all its records duly catalogued and indexed in a manner and form which facilitates the right to Information under the Right to Information Act and ensure that all records that are appropriate to be computerised are, within a reasonable time and subject to availability of resources, computerised and connected through a network so that access to such record is facilitated etc., 38. Section 7 of the Act contemplates the procedure for disposal of the request for supply of information, according to which the Central Public Information Officer or the State Information Officer, as the case may be, shall provide the information on payment of such fee as may be prescribed or reject the request for any of the reasons specified in Sections 8 and 9 of the Act, within the time limit mentioned hereunder: (i) within 30 days from the date of application in ordinary cases; (ii) within 48 hours where the information sought for concerns the life or liberty of a person; (iii) if the notice is required to be given to the third party regarding disclosure of information under section 11 of the Act, the period of ten days shall be added to the period within which the information is to be supplied, which period shall be given to the third party to make representation i.e., the time limit in such a case would be forty days; (iv) where the application is given to the Central or the State Assistant Public Information Officer, a period of five days shall be added to the statutory period of 30 days in view of proviso to sub-section (2) of section 5 of the Act. 39. To put it precisely, Section 7(2) of the Act speaks of failure to give decision within specified period to be deemed to be refusal. Furthermore, Section 20(1) of the Act, provides that the Central Information Commission or the State Information Commission, as the case may be, at the time of deciding any complaint or appeal shall impose a penalty of two hundred and fifty rupees each day till application is received or information is furnished, but the total amount of such penalty shall not exceed twenty five thousand rupees; if it is of the opinion that- (i) the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, has, without any reasonable cause, refused to receive an application for information; or (ii) has not furnished information within the time specified under sub-section (1) of section 7 of the Act; or (iii) malafidely denied the request for information; or (iv) knowingly given incorrect, incomplete or misleading information; or (v) has destroyed information which was the subject of the request; or (vi) has obstructed in any manner in furnishing the information. 40. The spirit and tenor of Section 8 of the Right to Information Act categorically deals with the cases of exemption from disclosure of information when such disclosure affects prejudicially the sovereignty and security of India etc., As regards the non-disclosure of information, it is to be pointed out that Sections 8 and 11 of the Act exhibit that there is total bar on six out of ten exceptions viz., (1)(a),(b),(c),(f),(g) and (h). Insofar as it relates to the matters envisaged under (1)(d),(e)(h) and (i) of Section 8 of the Act, the Information Officers are to record their findings by evaluating the relative merit between public interest and secrecy. 41. Section 8 of the Right to Information Act, 2005, gets attracted under two circumstances viz., (1) If the information is personal in nature and has no relationship to any public activity or interest and (2) furnishing of the same would cause unwarranted invasion of privacy of an individual, as per decision Kunche Durga Prasad & Anr. v. Public Information Officer, Office of Chief Manager (HR) Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd., Rajahmundry & Ors, AIR 2010 Andhra Pradesh 105 2010 Indlaw AP 65. 42. Section 10 of the Act, envisages that where a part of the information is exempted from disclosure, access to information may be provided to that part of the record, which does not contain any information, is exempted from disclosure under the Act. 43. It cannot be gainsaid that Clause 37 of the Letters Patent speaks of Regulation of proceedings which is quoted below: And we do further ordain that it shall be lawful for the said High Court of Judicature at Madras from time to time to make rules and orders for the purpose of regulating all proceedings in civil cases which may be brought before the said High Court, including proceedings in its Admiralty, Vice-Admiralty, testamentary intestate and matrimonial jurisdiction, respectively: Provided always that the said High Court shall be guided in making such rules and orders as far as possible by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, being an act passed by the Governor General-in council, and being Act No.VIII of 1859 and the provisions of any law which has been made, amending or altering the same, by competent legislative for India. 44. More significantly, Order XII Rules 1 & 2 of the High Court of Madras Appellate Side Rules, 1965, runs thus: 1. Nothing in these rules shall entitle a person to a copy of (1) Judges' notes or minutes, (2)correspondence not strictly judicial, and (3) confidential correspondence. 2. Any party to a proceeding shall be entitled to obtain copies of judgments, decrees or orders made or of any documents filed or exhibited in such proceeding on payment of charges in the manner prescribed under these rules. 45. A scrutiny of the ingredients of Section 18(3) of the Right to Information Act shows that the Central Information Commission or the State Information Commission has been vested with all the powers of Civil Court while trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in regard to the following matters: (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of persons and compel them to give oral or written evidence on oath and to produce the documents or things; (b) requiring the discovery and inspection of documents; (c) receiving evidence on affidavit; (d) requisitioning any public record or copies thereof from any court or office; (e) issuing summons for examination of witnesses or documents; and (f) any other matter which may be prescribed. (4) Notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained in any other Act of Parliament or State Legislature, as the case may be, the Central Information Commission or the State Information Commission, as the case may be, may, during the inquiry of any complaint under this Act, examine any record to which this Act applies which is under the control of the public authority, and no such record may be withheld from it on any grounds. 46. In fact, the 2nd Respondent/Tamil Nadu Information Commission, exercises its judicial powers and certainly, the said Commission, in our considered opinion, is amenable to Certiorari jurisdiction of this Court. 47. In terms of Section 18 of the Right to Information Act, the State Information Commission is only required to look into as to whether the endorsement issued by the Public Information Officer is inconformity with the Right to Information Act and also, whether the information which is sought for by the Petitioner/Applicant has been deliberately withheld or is not furnished within the time stipulated under the Act. Also that, as per Section 18 of the Act, the State Information Commission can conduct enquiry etc., as per decision Ahmedabad Education Society & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 2008 GUJARAT 42 2007 Indlaw GUJ 100. 48. At this juncture, this Court worth recalls the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in Union of India v. R.Gandhi, President, Madras Bar Association 2010 Indlaw SC 405, Madras Bar Association v. Union of India 2010 Indlaw SC 386, Civil Appeals No.3067 of 2004 with No.3717 of 2005, decided on 11.05.2010, at Page Nos.9 and 10, it is observed and held as under: The term 'Courts' refers to places where justice is administered or refers to Judges who exercise judicial functions. Courts are established by the state for administration of justice that is for exercise of the judicial power of the state to maintain and uphold the rights, to punish wrongs and to adjudicate upon disputes. Tribunals on the other hand are special alternative institutional mechanisms, usually brought into existence by or under a statute to decide disputes arising with reference to that particular statute, or to determine controversies arising out of any administrative law. Courts refer to Civil Courts, Criminal Courts and High Courts. Tribunals can be either private Tribunals (Arbitral Tribunals), or Tribunals constituted under the Constitution (Speaker or the Chairman acting under Para 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule) or Tribunals authorized by the Constitution(Administrative Tribunals under Article 323-A and Tribunals for other matters under Article 323-B) or Statutory Tribunals which are created under a statute (Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Debt Recovery Tribunals and Consumer Fora). Some Tribunals are manned exclusively by Judicial Officers (Rent Tribunals, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals). Other statutory Tribunals have Judicial and Technical Members (Administrative Tribunals, TDSAT, Competition Appellate Tribunal, Consumer Fora, Cyber Appellate Tribunal, etc). Though both Courts and Tribunals exercise judicial power and discharge similar functions, there are certain well-recognised differences between courts and Tribunals. They are : (i) Courts are established by the State and are entrusted with the State's inherent judicial power for administration of justice in general. Tribunals are established under a statute to adjudicate upon disputes arising under the said statute, or disputes of a specified nature. Therefore, all courts are Tribunals. But all Tribunals are not courts. (ii) Courts are exclusively manned by Judges. Tribunals can have a Judge as the sole member, or can have a combination of a Judicial Member and a Technical Member who is an expert in the field to which Tribunal relates. Some highly specialized fact finding Tribunals may have only Technical Members, but they are rare and are exceptions. (iii) While courts are governed by detailed statutory procedural rules, in particular the Code of Civil Procedure and Evidence Act, requiring an elaborate procedure in decision making, Tribunals generally regulate their own procedure applying the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure only where it is required, and without being restricted by the strict rules of Evidence Act. 49. Also, in the aforesaid decision, at Page No.14, it is held as follows: The issue is whether judicial functions can be transferred to Tribunals manned by persons who are not suitable or qualified or competent to discharge such judicial powers or whose independence is suspect. We have already held that the Legislature has the competence to transfer any particular jurisdiction from courts to Tribunals provided it is understood that the Tribunals exercise judicial power and the persons who are appointed as President/Chairperson/Members are of a standard which is reasonably approximate to the standards of main stream Judicial functioning. On the other hand, if a Tribunal is packed with members who are drawn from the civil services and who continue to be employees of different Ministries or Government Departments by maintaining lien over their respective posts, it would amount to transferring judicial functions to the executive which would go against the doctrine of separation of power and independence of judiciary. When the legislature proposes to substitute a Tribunal in place of the High Court to exercise the jurisdiction which the High Court is exercising, it goes without saying that the standards expected from the Judicial Members of the Tribunal and standards applied for appointing such members, should be as nearly as possible as applicable to High Court Judges, which are apart from a basic degree in law, rich experience in the practice of law, independent outlook, integrity, character and good reputation. It is also implied that only men of standing who have special expertise in the field to which the Tribunal relates, will be eligible for appointment as Technical members. Therefore, only persons with a judicial background, that is, those who have been or are Judges of the High Court and lawyers with the prescribed experience, who are eligible for appointment as High Court Judges, can be considered for appointment of Judicial Members. A lifetime of experience in administration may make a member of the civil services a good and able administrator, but not a necessarily good, able and impartial adjudicator with a judicial temperament capable of rendering decisions which have to (i) inform the parties about the reasons for the decision; (ii) demonstrate fairness and correctness of the decision and absence of arbitrariness; and (iii) ensure that justice is not only done, but also seem to be done. 50. Moreover, in the aforesaid decision of the Honourable Supreme Court, at Page Nos.15 and 16, it is observed and laid down as follows: Impartiality, independence, fairness and reasonableness in decision making are the hallmarks of Judiciary. If 'Impartiality' is the soul of Judiciary, 'Independence' is the life blood of Judiciary. Without independence, impartiality cannot thrive. Independence is not the freedom for Judges to do what they like. It is the independence of judicial thought. It is the freedom from interference and pressures which provides the judicial atmosphere where he can work with absolute commitment to the cause of justice and constitutional values. It is also the discipline in life, habits and outlook that enables a Judge to be impartial. Its existence depends however not only on philosophical, ethical or moral aspects but also upon several mundane things - security in tenure, freedom from ordinary monetary worries, freedom from influences and pressures within (from others in the Judiciary) and without (from the Executive). Independent judicial tribunals for determination of the rights of citizens, and for adjudication of the disputes and complaints of the citizens, is a necessary concomitant of the Rule of Law. Rule of Law has several facets, one of which is that disputes of citizens will be decided by Judges who are independent and impartial; and that disputes as to legality of acts of the Government will be decided by Judges who are independent of the Executive. Another facet of Rule of Law is equality before law. The essence of equality is that it must be capable of being enforced and adjudicated by an independent judicial forum. Judicial independence and separation of judicial power from the Executive are part of the common law traditions implicit in a Constitution like ours which is based on the Westminster model. 51. In the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court Namit Sharma v. Union of India, 2013-2-L.W.12012 Indlaw SC 311, wherein in Paragraphs 90 to 95, it is held as follows: 90. As already noticed, in the United Kingdom, the Information Rights Tribunal and the Information Commissioners are to deal with the matters arising from both, the FOIA as well as the Data Protection Act, 1998. These tribunals are discharging quasi judicial functions. Appointments to them are dealt with and controlled by the TCEA. These appointments are treated as judicial appointments and are covered under Part 2 of the TCEA. Section 50 provides for the eligibility conditions for judicial appointment. Section 50(1)(b) refers to a person who satisfies the judicial-appointment eligibility condition on an N-year basis. A person satisfies that condition on N-year basis if (a) the person has a relevant qualification and (b) the total length of the person s qualifying periods is at least N years. Section 52 provides for the meaning of the expression gain experience in law appearing in Section 50(3)(b). It states that a person gains experience in law during a period if the period is one during which the person is engaged in law-related activities. The essence of these statutory provisions is that the concerned person under that law is required to possess both a degree as well as experience in the legal field. Such experience inevitably relates to working in that field. Only then, the twin criteria of requisite qualification and experience can be satisfied. 91. It may be of some relevance here to note that in UK, the Director in the office of the Government Information Service, an authority created under the Freedom of Information Act, 2000 possesses a degree of law and has been a member of the Bar of the District of Columbia and North Carolina in UK. The Principal Judge of Information Rights Jurisdiction in the First-tier Tribunal, not only had a law degree but were also retired solicitors or barristers in private practice. 92. Thus, there exists a definite requirement for appointing persons to these posts with legal background and acumen so as to ensure complete faith and confidence of the public in the independent functioning of the Information Commission and for fair and expeditious performance of its functions. The Information Commissions are required to discharge their functions and duties strictly in accordance with law. 93. In India, in terms of sub-Section (5), besides being a person of eminence in public life, the necessary qualification required for appointment as Chief Information Commissioner or Information Commissioner is that the person should have wide knowledge and experience in law and other specified fields. The term experience in law is an expression of wide connotation. It presupposes that a person should have the requisite qualification in law as well as experience in the field of law. However, it is worthwhile to note that having a qualification in law is not equivalent to having experience in law and vice-versa. Experience in law , thus, is an expression of composite content and would take within its ambit both the requisite qualification in law as well as experience in the field of law. A person may have some experience in the field of law without possessing the requisite qualification. That certainly would not serve the requirement and purpose of the Act of 2005, keeping in view the nature of the functions and duties required to be performed by the Information Commissioners. Experience in absence of basic qualification would certainly be insufficient in its content and would not satisfy the requirements of the said provision. Wide knowledge in a particular field would, by necessary implication, refer to the knowledge relatable to education in such field whereas experience would necessarily relate to the experience attained by doing work in such field. Both must be read together in order to satisfy the requirements of Sections 12(5) of and 15(5) the Act of 2005. Similarly, wide knowledge and experience in other fields would have to be construed as experience coupled with basic educational qualification in that field. 94. Primarily it may depend upon the language of the rules which govern the service but it can safely be stated as a rule that experience in a given post or field may not necessarily satisfy the condition of prescribed qualification of a diploma or a degree in such field. Experience by working in a post or by practice in the respective field even for long time cannot be equated with the basic or the prescribed qualification. In absence of a specific language of the provision, it is not feasible for a person to have experience in the field of law without possessing a degree in law. In somewhat different circumstances, this Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Dharam Bir [(1998) 6 SCC 165 1998 Indlaw SC 1909], while dealing with Rule 8(2) of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Training (Gazetted) Service Recruitment Rules, 1985, took the view that the stated qualification for the post of Principal Class I or Principal Class II were also applicable to appointment by promotion and that the applicability of such qualification is not restricted to direct appointments. Before a person becomes eligible for being promoted to the post of Principal, Class II or Principal, Class-I, he must possess a Degree or Diploma in Engineering, as specified in the Schedule. The fact that the person had worked as a Principal for a decade would not lead to a situation of accepting that the person was qualified to hold the post. The Court held as under : 32. Experience gained by the respondent on account of his working on the post in question for over a decade cannot be equated with educational qualifications required to be possessed by a candidate as a condition of eligibility for promotion to higher posts. If the Government, in exercise of its executive power, has created certain posts, it is for it to prescribe the mode of appointment or the qualifications which have to be possessed by the candidates before they are appointed on those posts. The qualifications would naturally vary with the nature of posts or the service created by the Government. 33. The post in question is the post of Principal of the Industrial Training Institute. The Government has prescribed a Degree or Diploma in Engineering as the essential qualification for this post. No one who does not possess this qualification can be appointed on this post. The educational qualification has a direct nexus with the nature of the post. The Principal may also have an occasion to take classes and teach the students. A person who does not hold either a Degree or Diploma in Engineering cannot possibly teach the students of the Industrial Training Institute the technicalities of the subject of Engineering and its various branches. 95. Thus, in our opinion, it is clear that experience in the respective field referred to in Section 12(5) of the Act of 2005 would be an experience gained by the person upon possessing the basic qualification in that field. Of course, the matter may be somewhat different where the field itself does not prescribe any degree or appropriate course. But it would be applicable for the fields like law, engineering, science and technology, management, social service and journalism, etc. 52. Further, in the aforesaid decision, at Page Nos.44 and 45 in Paragraphs 106 and 107, it is laid down as follows: 106. For the elaborate discussion and reasons afore-recorded, we pass the following order and directions: 1. The writ petition is partly allowed. 2. The provisions of Sections 12(5 ) and 15(5) of the Act of 2005 are held to be constitutionally valid, but with the rider that, to give it a meaningful and purposive interpretation, it is necessary for the Court to read into these provisions some aspects without which these provisions are bound to offend the doctrine of equality. Thus, we hold and declare that the expression knowledge and experience appearing in these provisions would mean and include a basic degree in the respective field and the experience gained thereafter. Further, without any peradventure and veritably, we state that appointments of legally qualified, judicially trained and experienced persons would certainly manifest in more effective serving of the ends of justice as well as ensuring better administration of justice by the Commission. It would render the adjudicatory process which involves critical legal questions and nuances of law, more adherent to justice and shall enhance the public confidence in the working of the Commission. This is the obvious interpretation of the language of these provisions and, in fact, is the essence thereof. 3. As opposed to declaring the provisions of Section 12(6) and 15(6) unconstitutional, we would prefer to read these provisions as having effect post-appointment . In other words, cessation/ termination of holding of office of profit, pursuing any profession or carrying any business is a condition precedent to the appointment of a person as Chief Information Commissioner or Information Commissioner at the Centre or State levels. 4. There is an absolute necessity for the legislature to reword or amend the provisions of Senior Counsel Section 12(5), 12(6) and 15(5), 15(6) of the Act. We observe and hope that these provisions would be amended at the earliest by the legislature to avoid any ambiguity or impracticability and to make it in consonance with the Constitutional mandates. 5. We also direct that the Central Government and/or the competent authority shall frame all practice and procedure related rules to make working of the Information Commissions effective and in consonance with the basic rule of law. Such rules should be framed with particular reference to Section 27 and 28 of the Act within a period of six months from today. 6. We are of the considered view that it is an unquestionable proposition of law that the Commission is a judicial tribunal performing functions of judicial as well as quasi-judicial nature and having the trappings of a Court. It is an important cog and is part of the court attached system of administration of justice, unlike a ministerial tribunal which is more influenced and controlled and performs functions akin to the machinery of administration. 7. It will be just, fair and proper that the first appellate authority (i.e. the senior officers to be nominated in terms of Section 5 of the Act of 2005) preferably should be the persons possessing a degree in law or having adequate knowledge and experience in the field of law. 8. The Information Commissions at the respective levels shall henceforth work in Benches of two members each. One of them being a judicial member , while the other an expert member . The judicial member should be a person possessing a degree in law, having a judicially trained mind and experience in performing judicial functions. A law officer or a lawyer may also be eligible provided he is a person who has practiced law at least for a period of twenty years as on the date of the advertisement. Such lawyer should also have experience in social work. We are of the considered view that the competent authority should prefer a person who is or has been a Judge of the High Court for appointment as Information Commissioners. Chief Information Commissioner at the Centre or State level shall only be a person who is or has been a Chief Justice of the High Court or a Judge of the Supreme Court of India. 9. The appointment of the judicial members to any of these posts shall be made in consultation with the Chief Justice of India and Chief Justices of the High Courts of the respective States, as the case may be. 10.The appointment of the Information Commissioners at both levels should be made from amongst the persons empanelled by the DoPT in the case of Centre and the concerned Ministry in the case of a State. The panel has to be prepared upon due advertisement and on a rational basis as afore-recorded. 11. The panel so prepared by the DoPT or the concerned Ministry ought to be placed before the High-powered Committee in terms of Section 12(3), for final recommendation to the President of India. Needless to repeat that the High Powered Committee at the Centre and the State levels is expected to adopt a fair and transparent method of recommending the names for appointment to the competent authority. 12. The selection process should be commenced at least three months prior to the occurrence of vacancy. 13. This judgment shall have effect only prospectively. 14. Under the scheme of the Act of 2005, it is clear that the orders of the Commissions are subject to judicial review before the High Court and then before the Supreme Court of India. In terms of Article 141 of the Constitution, the judgments of the Supreme Court are law of the land and are binding on all courts and tribunals. Thus, it is abundantly clear that the Information Commission is bound by the law of precedence, i.e., judgments of the High Court and the Supreme Court of India. In order to maintain judicial discipline and consistency in the functioning of the Commission, we direct that the Commission shall give appropriate attention to the doctrine of precedence and shall not overlook the judgments of the courts dealing with the subject and principles applicable, in a given case. It is not only the higher courts judgments that are binding precedents for the Information Commission, but even those of the larger Benches of the Commission should be given due acceptance and enforcement by the smaller Benches of the Commission. The rule of precedence is equally applicable to intra appeals or references in the hierarchy of the Commission. 107. The writ petition is partly allowed with the above directions, however, without any order as to costs. 53. That apart, in the decision Bihar Public Service Commission v. Saiyed Hussain Abbas Rizwi and another, {2013-2-L.W.293}, at Special Page 298, wherein in Paragraphs 11 to 13, it is observed and thus: 11. The scheme of the Act contemplates for setting out the practical regime of right to information for citizens to secure access to information under the control of public authorities, in order to promote transparency and accountability in the working of every public authority. It was aimed at providing free access to information with the object of making governance more transparent and accountable. Another right of a citizen protected under the Constitution is the right to privacy. This right is enshrined within the spirit of Article 21 of the Constitution. Thus, the right to information has to be balanced with the right to privacy within the framework of law. 12. Where Section 3 of the Act grants right to citizens to have access to information, there Section 4 places an obligation upon the public authorities to maintain records and provide the prescribed information. Once an application seeking information is made, the same has to be dealt with as per Sections 6 and 7 of the Act. The request for information is to be disposed of within the time postulated under the provisions of Section 7 of the Act. Section 8 is one of the most important provisions of the Act as it is an exception to the general rule of obligation to furnish information. It gives the category of cases where the public authority is exempted from providing the information. To such exemptions, there are inbuilt exceptions under some of the provisions, where despite exemption, the Commission may call upon the authority to furnish the information in the larger public interest. This shows the wide scope of these provisions as intended by the framers of law. In such cases, the Information Commission has to apply its mind whether it is a case of exemption within the provisions of the said section. 13. Right to information is a basic and celebrated fundamental/basic right but is not uncontrolled. It has its limitations. The right is subject to a dual check. Firstly, this right is subject to the restrictions inbuilt within the Act and secondly the Constitutional limitations emerging from Article 21 of the Constitution. Thus, wherever in response to an application for disclosure of information, the public authority takes shelter under the provisions relating to exemption, non-applicability or infringement of Article 21 of the Constitution, the State Information Commission has to apply its mind and form an opinion objectively if the exemption claimed for was sustainable on facts of the case. 54. Further, in the aforesaid decision at Page Nos.299 and 300 in Paragraphs 16 to 22, it is observed and laid down as follows: 16. Thus, what has to be seen is whether the information sought for in exercise of right to information is one that is permissible within the framework of law as prescribed under the Act. If the information called for falls in any of the categories specified under Section 8 or relates to the organizations to which the Act itself does not apply in terms of section 24 of the Act, the public authority can take such stand before the commission and decline to furnish such information. Another aspect of exercise of this right is that where the information asked for relates to third party information, the Commission is required to follow the procedure prescribed under Section 11 of the Act. 17. Before the High Court, reliance had been placed upon Section 8(1)(j) and Section 11 of the Act. On facts, the controversy in the present case falls within a very narrow compass. Most of the details asked for by the applicant have already been furnished. The dispute between the parties related only to the first query of the applicant, that is, with regard to disclosure of the names and addresses of the members of the Interview Board. 18. On behalf of the Commission, reliance was placed upon Section 8(1)(j) and Section 11 of the Act to contend that disclosure of the names would endanger the life of the members of the interview board and such disclosure would also cause unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the interviewers. Further, it was contended that this information related to third party interest. The expression third party has been defined in Section 2(n) of the Act to mean a person other than the citizen making a request for information and includes a public authority. For these reasons, they were entitled to the exemption contemplated under Section 8(1)(j) and were not liable to disclose the required information. It is also contended on behalf of the Commission that the Commission was entitled to exemption under Sections 8(1)(e) and 8(1)(g) read together. 19. On the contrary, the submission on behalf of the applicant was that it is an information which the applicant is entitled to receive. The Commission was not entitled to any exemption under any of the provisions of Section 8, and therefore, was obliged to disclose the said information to the applicant. 20. In the present case, we are not concerned with the correctness or otherwise of the method adopted for selection of the candidates. Thus, the fact that no written examination was held and the selections were made purely on the basis of viva voce, one of the options given in the advertisement itself, does not arise for our consideration. We have to deal only with the plea as to whether the information asked for by the applicant should be directed to be disclosed by the Commission or whether the Commission is entitled to the exemption under the stated provisions of Section 8 of the Act. 21. Section 8 opens with the non obstante language and is an exception to the furnishing of information as is required under the relevant provisions of the Act. During the course of the hearing, it was not pressed before us that the Commission is entitled to the exemption in terms of Section 8(1)(j) of the Act. In view of this, we do not propose to discuss this issue any further nor would we deal with the correctness or otherwise of the impugned judgment of the High Court in that behalf. 22. Section 8(1)(e) provides an exemption from furnishing of information, if the information available to a person is in his fiduciary relationship unless the competent authority is satisfied that larger public interest warrants the disclosure of such information. In terms of Section 8(1)(g), the public authority is not obliged to furnish any such information the disclosure of which would endanger the life or physical safety of any person or identify the source of information or assistance given in confidence for law enforcement and security purposes. If the concerned public authority holds the information in fiduciary relationship, then the obligation to furnish information is obliterated. But if the competent authority is still satisfied that in the larger public interest, despite such objection, the information should be furnished, it may so direct the public authority. The term fiduciary refers to a person having a duty to act for the benefit of another, showing good faith and condour, where such other person reposes trust and special confidence in the person owing or discharging the duty. The term fiduciary relationship is used to describe a situation or transaction where one person places complete confidence in another person in regard to his affairs, business or transactions. This aspect has been discussed in some detail in the judgment of this Court in the case of Central Board of Secondary Education (supra). Section 8(1)(e), therefore, carves out a protection in favour of a person who possesses information in his fiduciary relationship. This protection can be negated by the competent authority where larger public interest warrants the disclosure of such information, in which case, the authority is expected to record reasons for its satisfaction. Another very significant provision of the Act is 8(1)(j). In terms of this provision, information which relates to personal information, the disclosure of which has no relationship to any public activity or interest or which would cause unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the individual would fall within the exempted category, unless the authority concerned is satisfied that larger public interest justifies the disclosure of such information. It is, therefore, to be understood clearly that it is a statutory exemption which must operate as a rule and only in exceptional cases would disclosure be permitted, that too, for reasons to be recorded demonstrating satisfaction to the test of larger public interest. It will not be in consonance with the spirit of these provisions, if in a mechanical manner, directions are passed by the appropriate authority to disclose information which may be protected in terms of the above provisions. All information which has come to the notice of or on record of a person holding fiduciary relationship with another and but for such capacity, such information would not have been provided to that authority, would normally need to be protected and would not be open to disclosure keeping the higher standards of integrity and confidentiality of such relationship. Such exemption would be available to such authority or department. 55. Ultimately, in the aforesaid decision at Page No.305 in Paragraph 30, it is inter alia observed thus: 30. The above reasoning of the Bench squarely applies to the present case as well. The disclosure of names and addresses of the members of the Interview Board would ex facie endanger their lives or physical safety. The possibility of a failed candidate attempting to take revenge from such persons cannot be ruled out. On the one hand, it is likely to expose the members of the Interview Board to harm and, on the other, such disclosure would serve no fruitful much less any public purpose. Furthermore, the view of the High Court in the judgment under appeal that element of bias can be traced and would be crystallized only if the names and addresses of the examiners/interviewers are furnished is without any substance. The element of bias can hardly be co-related with the disclosure of the names and addresses of the interviewers. Bias is not a ground which can be considered for or against a party making an application to which exemption under Section 8 is pleaded as a defence. We are unable to accept this reasoning of the High Court. Suffice it to note that the reasoning of the High Court is not in conformity with the principles stated by this Court in the CBSE case (supra). The transparency that is expected to be maintained in such process would not take within its ambit the disclosure of the information called for under query No.1 of the application. Transparency in such cases is relatable to the process where selection is based on collective wisdom and collective marking. Marks are required to be disclosed but disclosure of individual names would hardly hold relevancy either to the concept of transparency or for proper exercise of the right to information within the limitation of the Act. 56. In terms of Section 19 of the Right to Information Act, 2005, the Second Respondent/Tamil Nadu Information Commission, Chennai, is a Tribunal clothed with an appeal power to determine the Appeal as per decision Poornaprajna House Building Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Karnataka Information Commissioner & Ors, AIR 2007 KARNATAKA 136 2007 Indlaw KAR 312. 57. On going through the entire gamut of the Right to Information Act, 2005, one can discern that there is no provision in the Act for reviewing the orders passed by the Information Commission as per decision Capt. V.K.Sehgal, Chandigarh, Vs. Public Information Officer, O/O. The Director, Sainik Welfare, Punjab, (2008) 1 ID 25 (State Information Commission, Punjab). 58. This Court, more relevantly cites the decision of the High Court of Delhi in Secretary General, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal, 2010 (1) CTC 241 2010 Indlaw DEL 9 (Full Bench), whereby and whereunder, it is observed that 'every citizen is entitled to information held by or under Control of Public Authority unless it is exempted by Section 8(1) of the Right to Information Act etc.,' Further, it is held that 'the Resolution of Full Court of the Honourable Supreme Court treating declaration of assets by Judges as confidential does not make it any less information which citizen is entitled to access'. 59. Assailing the Judgment in L.P.A.No.501/2009, dated 12.01.2010 (by the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court) between Secretary General, Supreme Court of India and Subhash Chandra Agarwal, the Central Public Information Officer of Supreme Court of India and another (on the file of the Honourable Supreme Court of India) have filed Civil Appeal No.10044 of 2010 (arising out of SLP (C)32855 of 2009) and the Honourable Supreme Court taking up the said case with C.A.10045/2010 @ SLP (C)No.32856 of 2009 (Central Public Information Officer of Supreme Court of India and another v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal 2010 Indlaw DEL 9 and Civil Appeal No.2683 of 2010, Secretary General, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal 2010 Indlaw DEL 9) in the Judgment dated 26.11.2010, in Paragraphs 12 to 19 has observed and held as under: 12. Having heard the learned Attorney General and the learned counsel for the respondent, we are of the considered opinion that a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of theConstitution is involved in the present case which is required to be heard by a Constitution Bench. The case on hand raises important questions of constitutional importance relating to the position of Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India under the Constitution and the independence of the Judiciary in the scheme of the Constitution on the one hand and on the other, fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression. Right to information is an integral part of the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by the Constitution. Right to Information Act merely recognizes the Constitutional right of citizens to freedom of speech and expression. Independence of Judiciary forms part of basic structure of the Constitution of India. The independence of Judiciary and the fundamental right to free speech and expression are of a great value and both of them are required to be balanced. 13. the Constitution is fundamentally a public text-the monumental character of a Government and the people-and Supreme Court is required to apply it to resolve public controversies. For, from our beginnings, a most important consequence of the Constitutionally created separation of powers has been the Indian habit, extraordinary to other democracies, of casting social, economic, philosophical and political questions in the form of public law remedies, in an attempt to secure ultimate resolution by the Supreme Court. In this way, important aspects of the most fundamental issues confronting our democracy finally arrive in the Supreme Court for judicial determination. Not infrequently, these are the issues upon which contemporary society is most deeply divided. They arouse our deepest emotions. This is one such controversy. William J. Bennan, Jr. in one of his public discourse observed: We current Justices read the Constitution in the only way that we can: as twentieth-century Americans. We look to the history of the time of framing and to the intervening history of interpretation. But the ultimate question must be, what do the words of the text mean in our time? For the genius of the Constitution rests not in any static meaning it might have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in the adaptability of its great principles to cope with current problems and current needs. What the Constitutional fundamentals meant to the wisdom of other times cannot be the measure to the vision of our time. Similarly, what those fundamentals mean for us, our descendants will learn, cannot be the measure to the vision of their time. This realization is not, I assure you, a novel one of my own creation. Permit me to quote from one of the opinions of our Court, Weems V. United States, 217 U.S. 349, written nearly a century ago: Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore, a principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth. This is peculiarly true of constitutions. They are not ephemeral enactments, designed to meet passing occasions. They are, to use the words of Chief Justice John Marshall, designed to approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it. The future is their care and provision for events of good and bad tendencies of which no prophesy can be made. In the application of a constitution, therefore, our contemplation cannot be only of what has been, but of what may be. 14. The current debate is a sign of a healthy nation. This debate on the Constitution involves great and fundamental issues. Most of the times we reel under the pressure of precedents. We look to the history of the time of framing and to the intervening history of interpretation. But the ultimate question must be, what do the words of the text mean in our time? 15. Following substantial questions of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution arise for consideration: 1. Whether the concept of independence of judiciary requires and demands the prohibition of furnishing of the information sought? Whether the information sought for amounts to interference in the functioning of the judiciary? 2. Whether the information sought for cannot be furnished to avoid any erosion in the credibility of the decisions and to ensure a free and frank expression of honest opinion by all the Constitutional functionaries, which is essential for effective consultation and for taking the right decision? 3. Whether the information sought for is exempt under Section 8(i)(j) of the Right to Information Act? 16. The above questions involve the interpretation of the Constitution raise great and fundamental issues. 17. For the aforesaid reasons, we direct the Registry to place this matter before Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India for constitution of a Bench of appropriate strength. Let the papers be accordingly placed before Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India. 18. Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 32856 of 2009. Leave granted. Tag with Civil Appeal arising out of S.L.P.(c) No. 32855 of 2009. 19. Civil Appeal No. 2683 of 2010 Tag with Civil Appeal arising out of S.L.P.(c) No. 32855 of 2009. 60. It is to be pointed out that Section 11 of the Right to Information Act speaks of the term third party information under Clause (n) of Section 2 of the Right to Information Act, 2005, means a person other than the citizen making a request for information and includes a Public Authority. In Law, the third parties have a right to be heard in respect of Applications and Appeals dealing with informations submitted by them to the Government in confidence, in terms of Section 2(n) and Section 11 of the Act. 61. A third party request to be consulted (i) if the Public Information Officer is considering the relief of information (ii)the information relates to third party or was given to Public Authority by third party in confidence (iii)the third party treated the information to be a confidential one. 62. In order to satisfy the third test as stated supra, a third party has the right to be consulted as to whether the information ought to be released. In this regard, the Public Information Officer is to send a written notice, within five days requiring the third party to make a submission regarding the impending disclosure. The third party has within ten days from the date of the notice received is to make submission. Whether or not a response is received, the Public Information Officer is to make a decision about whether or not to disclose the information within forty days of receipt of application. Before arriving at a decision, the Public Information Officer is to take into account any representation made by the third party. 63. Even if a third party claims confidentiality the information sought for by the Petitioner/Applicant cannot be withheld unless it clearly comes within the stated exemptions, in our considered opinion. 64. In the decision Peoples Union of Civil Liberties v. Union of India, {AIR 1997 SC 568 1996 Indlaw SC 1508}, it is held that Right to Privacy by itself is identified under the Constitution of India. Right to privacy is not enumerated as a fundamental right in our constitution. But, it can be inferred from Article 21 of the Constitution of India, in our considered opinion. 65. The right to privacy as a distinctive concept originated in the field of Law of Torts , in and by which a new cause of action for damages resulting from illegal incursion of privacy was recognised. The two aspects of this right are (a)the general right of privacy which affords a tort action for damages resulting from an unlawful invasion of privacy (b)the statutory recognition afforded to the right to privacy which protects personal privacy and confidentiality against unlawful Governmental invasion, as per decision R.Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu, {AIR 1995 SC 264 1994 Indlaw SC 832}. 66. It is to be remembered that proviso to Section 11 of the Right to Information Act, 2005, envisages that the disclosure of such information relating to or supplied by a third party, except in the case of trade or commercial secrets protected by law, may be allowed if the public interest in disclosure outweighs in importance any possible harm or injury to the interests of such third party. 67. In Europe Articles 4 to 10 of the convention for production of individuals that recorded automatic process of personal data (1981) and Europe Union Data Protection Directive (1995) prescribed the essential principles according to which personal data collection cannot be made/done till the individual (data subject) has given his consent. Likewise, the ingredients of Section 70 and 72 of the Information Technology Act, 2000, deals with the right to privacy in respect of computer network and penalty therefor. Added further, before the collection of data, according to Organisation in Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) a notice ought to be given to the concerned individuals (data subject) together with the particulars of information being collected and his consent must be obtained. During the year 1980, necessary guidelines on the protection of privacy and transborder flow of information (personal data) have been issued. 68. Section 19(4) of the Right to Information Act, 2005, enables a third party to make representations before the Departmental Appellate Authorities or the Information Commission in regard to an appeal which relates to third party Information . 69. A Second Appeal against the decision of the First Appeal shall lie within 90 days from the date on which the decision should have been made or was actually received by the aggrieved individual, either to the Central Information Commission or the State Information Commission. The Central Information Commission or the State Information Commission, may admit an Appeal after the expiry of limitation period of 90 days, if it is satisfied that the Appellant was prevented from sufficient cause in preferring the Appeal within the specified time. 70. The First Appeal and the Second Appeal under the Act, are to be disposed of by the respective Appellate Authorities viz., the senior officers in the Public Authority and the Information Commission within thirty days of the receipt of Appeal or within such extended period not exceeding a total of 45 days from the date of preferring of the Appeal, for reasons to be recorded in writing, in terms of the statutory period prescribed. 71. As far as the present case is concerned, the 1st Respondent sent his representation dated 27.01.2011, addressed to the Public Information Officer (Registrar (administration) of Madras High Court requesting for the supply of copies of affidavits, counter affidavits and final orders in W.P.No.11597 of 1988 dated 16.08.1998 and W.P.No.12518 of 1994 dated 04.07.2001. 72. Only on 27.04.2011, the Deputy Registrar (RTI Act)/APIO sent a reply to the 1st Respondent/Petitioner stating that the copies of the petition and affidavit in W.P.No.12518 of 1994, copies of the order dated 04.07.2001 in W.P.No.12518 of 1994, typedset of papers containing Page Nos. 1 to 78 and list of members dated 26.08.1993, the copy obtained by way of filing Copy Application before the CD Section of the Registry as per Madras High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1965. Further, the 1st Respondent/Petitioner was informed that in respect of information relating to W.P.No.11597 of 1988, the same would be furnished to him as soon as the bundle was traced out. 73. The 1st Respondent/Petitioner preferred an Appeal on 10.03.2011 (under Section 19 of the Act) before the Appellate Authority on 10.03.2011 because of the reason that he was not provided with the copies of documents sought for by him. The Deputy Registrar (RTI Act)/APIO on 27.04.2011 sent a reply among other things stating that he can obtain the copies of document sought for by him by filing copy application before the CD Section as per the Madras High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1965, etc. The 1st Respondent/Petitioner again sent a representation dated 23.12.2012 under the Right to Information Act, praying for supply of typedset of papers along with the affidavit, counter affidavit and final orders in W.P.No.11597 of 1988 and W.P.No.12518 of 1994. 74. It appears that the Deputy Registrar (RTI Act) on 02.01.2012 of this Court on 02.01.2012 lodged the Petition of the 1st Respondent/Petitioner dated 23.12.2011 stating that information was already furnished on 01.12.2001 . On 23.01.2012, the 1st Respondent/Petitioner preferred an Appeal before the Registrar General of this Court (Appellate Authority under RTI Act). However, the 1st Respondent/petitioner preferred a Second Appeal on 10.03.2012 under Section 19(3) of the Act, inasmuch as he received no reply from the Registrar General of this Court (Appellate Authority underRTI Act). The 2nd Respondent/Tamil Nadu Information Commission, Chennai, issued a summon in Case No.12498/A/12, dated 23.04.2012, addressed to the Public Information Officer of the Registrar's office of this Court requiring him to appear along with prime documents in connection with hearing of the case on 16.05.2012 at 11.30AM. On 16.05.2012, the case in Reference No.18603-11 & 12498-12/Enquiry/A/2012, was heard in the presence of 1st Respondent/Petitioner and Public Information Officer of this Court. Ultimately, on 17.05.2012, the 2nd Respondent passed an order directing the Petitioner/High Court to supply the copies asked for by the 1st Respondent/Applicant free of cost as per section 7(6) of the Right to Information Act, before 25.05.2012 and also, sought for an explanation to be submitted on or before 31.05.2012 as to why action should not be taken under Section 20(1) of the Act, for not furnishing the information by the Petitioner/High Court. 75. It is to be remembered that the Writ jurisdiction of the High Court and the Honourable Supreme Court under Articles 226 and 32 of the Constitution of India remain unaltered and as such, an order of the State Information Commission is open to challenge in Writ jurisdiction. 76. Admittedly, the 1st Respondent/Petitioner is not a party to the proceedings in W.P.No.11597 of 1988. As a matter of fact, the said W.P.No.11597 of 1988 was filed by M.Nagoor Meeran v. The State of Tamil Nadu 1994 Indlaw MAD 62 represented by its Commissioner and secretary to Government, Commercial Taxes and Religious Endowments Department, Fort St. George, Madras-9 and 3 others. Ultimately, this Court dismissed the W.P.No.11597 of 1988 on 16.08.1999. Insofar as W.P.No.12518 of 1994 is concerned, the Petitioner is Madurai District Vyavasaigal Sangam (Reg.No.92/1993) rep. by its President M.Pandian, Periakulam-626 501, v.The State of Tamil Nadu represented by its Secretary, Revenue Department, Fort St. George, Madras-9 and 3 others. The W.P.No.12518 of 1994 was dismissed on 04.07.2001. As such, it is latently and patently evident that the Petitioner/1st Respondent in W.P.No.28202 of 2012 (filed by the Registrar General of this Court) is a third party to the proceedings in two Writ Petitions referred to supra. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the 1st Respondent/Petitioner can invoke the aid of Clause 37 of the Letters Patent which confers power on this Court (High Court of Madras) from time to time to make rules and orders for the purpose of regulating all proceedings in Civil Cases which may be brought before this Court etc. Besides this, as per Order XII Rule 1 and 2 of this Court Appellate Side Rules, 1965, any party is to obtain the certified copies as stated thereunder. Further, as per ROC.4282-A-2010/F1, amendment of the Rules of High Court, Madras, Appellate Side, 1965, the 1st Respondent/Petitioner as a third party, can apply for copy of the documents in the manner provided under rules. In fact in SRO-C-18/10, Amendment to Rules 3 and 4 of Order XII of the Rules of High Court of Madras, Appellate Side, 1965, have been brought into force. 77. In the light of elaborate narrations and discussions mentioned supra and on an in depth analysis of the entire gamut-subject matter in issue, we hold that the 1st Respondent/petitioner is entitled to receive the copies of affidavit in W.P.No.11597 of 1988 and 12518 of 1994 (filed by the Petitioner and the Respondent) together with all enclosure of documents) and the certified copies of orders in both the Writ Petitions only in accordance with the relevant rules of High Court Madras (Appellate Side), 1965. Therefore, the contrary view taken by the 2nd Respondent/Tamil Nadu Information Commission, Chennai, as per order dated 17.05.2012 in Case No.18603-11 & 12498 - 12/Enquiry/A/2012, directing the Petitioner/High Court to furnish the copies of documents sought for by the 1st Respondent/Petitioner at free of cost under Section 7(6) of the Act on or before 25.05.2012, is not legally correct. Also, the further direction issued by the 2nd Respondent/Tamil Nadu Information Commission in its impugned order dated 17.05.2012 requiring the Petitioner/High Court to submit his explanation on or before 31.05.2012 as to why action should not be taken under Section 20(1) of the Right to Information Act for not furnishing the information, is an illegal one because of the simple fact that under the Constitution of India judiciary is free from Executive and Legislature (notwithstanding the fact that under Section 22 of the Right to Information Act, 2005, the provisions of this Act have an overriding effect in respect of Official Secrets Act, 1923 and in other law, in the time being in force, etc.,) and more so, when there is a self-contained and inbuilt procedure evolved by High Court in regard to the litigants obtaining certified copies of orders pertaining to judicial proceedings as per Rules of High Court, Appellate Side, 1965, which is to be scrupulously followed by the 1st Respondent/Petitioner. 78. Viewed from the above angle, to promote substantial cause of Justice, we interfere with the orders dated 17.05.2012 in Case No.18603-11 & 12498-12/Enquiry/A/2012, passed by the 2nd Respondent/Tamil Nadu Information Commission, Chennai and set aside the same. Resultantly, the Writ Petition succeeds. 79. In the result, the Writ Petition is allowed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Consequently, the order passed by the Tamil Nadu Information Commission, Chennai, in Case No.18603-11 & 12498-12/Enquiry/A/2012, dated 17.05.2012, is set aside by this Court for the reasons assigned in this Writ Petition. As and when the 1st Respondent/Petitioner files necessary copy application to obtain the copies of the petition and affidavit in W.P.Nos.11597 of 1988 and 12518 of 1994, typedset of papers and the certified copies of the orders dated 04.07.2001 and 16.08.1998 in W.P.Nos.11597 of 1988 and 12518 of 1994 etc., before the CD Section of the Registry of this Court in terms of Rules of the High Court Madras, Appellate Side, 1965, together with payment of necessary charges, then to prevent an aberration of Justice, we direct the Registrar General of this Court (Petitioner in the Writ Petition) to supply the copies sought for by the 1st Respondent/Petitioner by adhering to the rules, within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed. Petition allowed